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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff-Appellee, 
v. 
KENT WALTER BINGHAM, 
Defendant-Appellant 
Case No. 950109-CA 
Priority No. 2 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
Defendant Kent Walter Bingham appeals his convictions 
for theft by receiving stolen property, a second degree felony 
under Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-408 (1995), and for unlawful 
possession of drug paraphernalia, a class B misdemeanor under 
Utah Code Ann. § 58-37a-5 (1994). The convictions were entered 
upon jury verdicts in the Third Judicial District Court, in and 
for Salt Lake County, Utah, the Honorable David S. Young, 
presiding. This Court has jurisdiction under Utah Code Ann. § 
78-2a-3(2) (f) (Supp. 1994). 
QUESTIONS PRESENTED 
AND 
STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
I. Did the trial court properly find that the State 
presented credible, race-neutral reasons for removing an African-
American and a Hispanic prospective juror via peremptory strikes? 
Under settled law, appellate courts grant high deference to such 
rulings, upholding them unless they are clearly erroneous. See 
Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352, 364-70 (1991) (detailed 
explanation why "clear error" standard applies). Accord State v. 
Cantu, 778 P.2d 517, 518 (Utah 1989); State v. Macial, 854 P.2d 
543, 545 (Utah App.), cert, denied, 862 P.2d 1356 (Utah 1993); 
State v. Harrison, 805 P.2d 769, 778 (Utah App.), cert, denied, 
817 P.2d 327 (Utah 1991). 
II. Did the trial court properly overrule Bingham's 
objection to an alleged prosecutorial misstatement of law in 
closing argument? The question whether a prosecutor misstated 
the law is apparently viewed without deference, e.g., State v. 
Boyatt, 854 P.2d 550, 554-55 (Utah App.), cert, denied, 862 P.2d 
1356 (Utah 1993). However, the question whether prosecutorial 
misstatement or misconduct warrants a mistrial is reviewed with 
great deference to the trial court's ruling. See, e.g., State v. 
Hay, 859 P.2d 1, 6 (Utah 1993); State v. Gardner, 789 P.2d 273, 
287 (Utah 1989), cert, denied, 494 U.S. 1090 (1990); State v. 
Speer, 750 P.2d 186, 190 (Utah 1988); State v. Cummins, 839 P.2d 
848, 853 (Utah App. 1992), cert, denied, 853 P.2d 897 (Utah 1993) 
(all stating "abuse of discretion" standard). A similarly 
deferential standard should apply to rulings on objections 
claiming prosecutorial misstatement. 
III. Did the trial court properly deny Bingham's 
mistrial motion, made in response to a prospective juror's voir 
dire admission that she had previously viewed Bingham in another 
court, wearing jail clothing? A deferential, "abuse of 
discretion" standard applies to this issue as well. See, e.g., 
State v. Menzies, 889 P.2d 393, 401 (Utah 1994), cert, denied, 
115 S. Ct. 910 (1995); State v. Wetzel, 868 P.2d 64, 70 (Utah 
2 
1993); State v. Gordon, 886 P.2d 112, 115 (Utah App. 1994); State 
v. Morgan, 865 P.2d 1377, 1381 (Utah App. 1993); State v. Burk, 
839 P.2d 880, 883 (Utah App. 1992), cert, denied, 862 P.2d 1356 
(Utah 1993). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
Bingham invokes U.S. CONST, amend XIV § 1, and UTAH CONST. 
art. I § 24 in support of his arguments. Those provisions are 
copied in addendum A to his Brief of Appellant. Utah Code Ann. 
§§ 76-6-401 (1995), and 76-6-402, and 76-6-408 (1995), defining 
theft and theft by receiving, and Utah Code Ann. §§ 41-la-1311 
and 41-la-1314 (1993), defining "joyriding," are copied in the 
appendix to this brief. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Bingham was charged with one count of theft by 
receiving stolen property, classified as a second degree felony 
because the stolen item was an automobile, see Utah Code Ann. § 
76-6-412(1) (a) (ii) (1995), and with one count of unlawful 
possession of drug paraphernalia, a class B misdemeanor (R. 8-
10). A jury found him guilty on both counts (R. 150-51). 
Bingham was sentenced to one-to-fifteen years imprisonment on the 
theft charge, and to six months in jail on the paraphernalia 
charge, to be served concurrently; fines and surcharges were also 
imposed (R. 161-62) . 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The facts supporting Bingham's convictions are recited 
in verdict-favoring light. State v. Verde, 770 P.2d 116, 117 
3 
(Utah 1989). Ms. Jackie Redmon's 1979 Datsun 280-ZX automobile 
was taken without permission from the parking lot of a 
convenience store, located southwest of Salt Lake City, on a 
September evening (R. 250-52, 255). Ms. Redmon had left the 
vehicle with its key in the ignition, intending to run a brief 
errand in the store (R. 251). 
Roughly seven hours later, a police officer observed 
the Datsun being driven erratically by Bingham, still in the 
southwest area of the Salt Lake Valley (R. 260). The officer 
confronted Bingham after he parked the Datsun, bumping another 
vehicle in the process (R. 261). A routine computer check 
revealed a stolen vehicle report on the vehicle, and Bingham, who 
initially gave a false name, was arrested (R. 263-64) . Several 
syringes and a bent spoon were found behind the Datsun's seat, 
and were seized (R. 278)-1 
Contacted to retrieve her vehicle, Ms. Redmon saw that 
the Datsun's license plates had been removed and substituted with 
other plates (R. 252). A distinctive sticker on the Datsun had 
been covered, and personal items, including a stereo set, had 
been removed (R. 252-53). Some cotton swabs, a pocket knife, and 
spilled beer, not belonging to Ms. Redmon, were also found in the 
Datsun (R. 254). Although nearly empty when taken, the Datsun's 
gas tank was full when recovered (R. 254). 
lAfter the stop, Bingham appeared confused, and was only 
partially responsive to officer commands (R. 262-63, 274). At one 
point, he got back into the Datsun and reached into the area where 
the syringes were found, prompting a concern about hidden weapons 
(R. 275-76) . 
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At his trial, Bingham testified that he "stole" the 
Datsun from the convenience store, and that he had switched the 
license plates and covered the window sticker in order to avoid 
detection (R. 324-25, 328). He also admitted that he was a 
heroin addict, and had driven the Datsun to Pioneer Park, in Salt 
Lake City, to purchase heroin on the evening of the theft. He 
obtained funds for the heroin by shoplifting and then selling 
several cartons of cigarettes (R. 313-14, 324-25). His ensuing 
intoxication impaired his driving ability, leading to his 
apprehension (R. 328-29) . 
Bingham testified that it had not been his intention to 
permanently keep the Datsun; rather, he claimed that he had 
planned to abandon it (R. 329-32). On cross-examination, 
however, Bingham admitted that he required a vehicle for his 
daily trips to purchase heroin (R. 333-34). On redirect 
examination, Bingham further admitted that he had permanently 
abandoned his own automobile, because it no longer functioned (R. 
340-41). 
The jury found Bingham guilty of theft by receiving and 
possession of drug paraphernalia (R. 150-51). Bingham appeals. 
Other facts pertaining to Bingham's assignments of error will be 
set forth under the pertinent argument points of this brief. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The trial court properly determined that the State's 
peremptory strikes of two minority-race jurors were motivated by 
credible, race-neutral concerns. Under settled federal and state 
5 
precedent, such a credibility-based determination is reviewed 
only for "clear error." There being no such error in this case, 
the trial court's judgment on this point must be affirmed. 
Bingham's objection to the prosecutor's alleged 
misstatement of law in closing argument was also properly 
overruled. The objected-to statement accurately conveyed that 
misdemeanor "joyriding" is limited by a twenty-four hour period 
of unlawful vehicle use. In argument, the prosecutor was 
permitted to contrast familiar, prankish joyriding with Bingham's 
actions, to persuade the jury that Bingham intended to steal, not 
joyride, the vehicle in question. Additionally, the prosecutor's 
statement was more prejudicial to the State than to the defense, 
because it suggested that Bingham, who only kept the vehicle for 
seven hours, could not have stolen it. 
Finally, the trial court properly rejected Bingham's 
argument that a mistrial was required because a single 
prospective juror admitted, during open voir dire, that she had 
previously seen Bingham wearing jail attire. Comparison to other 
cases involving juror views of defendants in restraints or jail 
clothing confirms that the trial court did not abuse its 
discretion in denying Bingham's mistrial motion. Further, the 
jurors' awareness of the prior sighting was harmless, given the 
trial court's admonition to disregard it, and because Bingham 
severely prejudiced himself with his own trial testimony. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT ONE 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DENIED BINGHAM'S 
"BATSON" OBJECTIONS TO THE STATE'S USE OF TWO 
PEREMPTORY STRIKES AGAINST MINORITY-RACE 
PROSPECTIVE JURORS 
Bingham first urges this Court to overturn the trial 
court's finding that two State's peremptory strikes, removing 
minority-race prospective jurors, were legitimately exercised in 
race-neutral fashion (R. 233-34). Under the line of cases 
associated with Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986), racial 
discrimination in the use of peremptory strikes is prohibited by 
federal equal protection principles. One improper peremptory 
strike constitutes cause to reverse a criminal conviction; no 
"harmless error" is possible. Batson, 476 U.S. at 100; State v. 
Pharris, 846 P.2d 454, 465 (Utah App.), cert, denied, 857 P.2d 
948 (Utah 1993) . 
A. The Standard of Review. 
The State did not contest whether Bingham had made a 
prima facie showing of improper discrimination under Batson (R. 
23 0-31) . Accordingly, this Court need only review whether the 
trial court properly found that the prosecutor's explanations for 
the State's peremptory challenges were race-neutral and credible, 
defeating the claim of improper discrimination. Hernandez v. New 
York, 500 U.S. 352, 359 (1991); State v. Harrison, 805 P.2d 769, 
777 (Utah App.), cert, denied, 817 P.2d 327 (Utah 1991). As set 
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forth in this brief's statement of issues, such a ruling is 
reversed on appeal only if "clearly erroneous."2 
Bingham urges more intrusive review of peremptory 
strikes under article I § 24, the "uniform operation of laws" 
provision of the Utah Constitution (Br. of Appellant at 17-18). 
He does not specify whether such review should apply in the trial 
court, on appeal, or both. In either case, that bid should be 
rejected, first, because Bingham never advanced it in the trial 
court. State v. Bobo, 803 P.2d 1268, 1273 (Utah App. 1990). 
Additionally, the United States Supreme Court has expressly held 
that a "clear error" standard of appellate review applies. 
Hernandez, 500 U.S. at 364-70. That holding binds Utah's 
appellate courts. State v. Thurman, 846 P.2d 1256, 1266 (Utah 
2The State agrees that the question whether the peremptorily 
struck juror is the same race as the party challenging the strike 
is irrelevant. Powers v. Ohio, U.S. , 111 S. Ct. 1364 
(1991) (Br. of Appellant at 22). Therefore, the State's appellate 
analysis, like the trial prosecutor's response to Bingham's 
challenges, disregards the trial court's finding that Bingham has 
a different racial heritage than the jurors in question. 
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1993) .3 Applying these standards, the trial court properly 
rejected Bingham's objections to the State's peremptory strikes. 
B. Panelist Judith Gonzales. 
Bingham accurately recounts his objection to the 
State's peremptory strike of Mrs. Gonzales, who the State 
conceded "could be hispanic" (R. 231; Br. of Appellant at 20-21). 
Cf. State v. Span, 819 P.2d 329, 340-42 (Utah 1991) (perception 
of panelist as racial minority suffices to press Batson claim). 
The prosecutor explained that "the most important factor" driving 
his decision to strike Gonzales was his "perception of her mental 
processes as she perceived the [voir dire] questions and manner 
she answered them, the halting, hesitating manner in which she 
answered them" (R. 233). Gonzales had been "a bit slow and 
halting, her speech pattern seemed to be that she had to think 
about things a little bit and the State was concerned whether she 
3More intrusive review of peremptory strikes under state 
"uniform operation" principles could cause race-based preferential 
seating of certain jurors, by granting extra, race-based insulation 
against peremptory removal. That, in turn, could violate federal 
equal protection law. See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 
U.S. , 115 S. Ct. 2097, 2113 (1995) ("[A] 11 racial 
classifications, imposed by whatever federal, state, or local 
governmental actor, must be analyzed by a reviewing court under 
strict scrutiny"). 
Even when a prima facie case of race-based strikes is made, 
the burden remains on the challenging party to prove actual racial 
discrimination. Hernandez, 500 U.S. at 360. Race-neutral reasons 
for peremptory strikes need not be related to the case at bar. 
Purkett v. Elam, U.S. , 115 S. Ct. 1769, 1771 (1995). To 
the extent that State v. Span, 819 P.2d 329, 342 (Utah 1991) and 
State v. Cantu, 778 P. 2d 517, 518-19 (1989) suggest otherwise (Br. 
of Appellant at 20), they conflict with controlling United States 
Supreme Court explanations of Batson challenges. 
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would be able to grasp what the State is going to present, 
particularly closing arguments" (R. 232). 
Bingham argues on appeal, as he did in the trial court, 
that the prosecutor's explanation for striking Mrs. Gonzales 
based upon her level of education seemed inconsistent with other 
jurors whom the State did not strike (R. 232-33; Br. of Appellant 
at 21). To that argument, the prosecutor responded that he had 
factored both education plus type of employment into his use of 
peremptory strikes (R. 233). However he may criticise that 
response, Bingham never took issue with the prosecutor's 
assessment of Mrs. Gonzales' "slow and halting" speech pattern, 
and his "most important" concern that she might not readily 
understand the State's case. 
Ultimately, the trial court found the prosecutor's 
justification for striking Mrs. Gonzales to be both race-neutral 
and credible. See Batson, 476 U.S. at 98 n.21 (trial court's 
resolution of objection "largely will turn on evaluation of 
credibility").4 The "clear error" appellate review standard 
comtemplates that "[w]here there are two permissible views of the 
evidence, the factfinder's choice between them cannot be clearly 
erroneous." Hernandez, 500 U.S. at 369 (quoting Anderson v. 
Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564, 574 (1985)). This Court must 
4So long as it is race-neutral, a party's explanation for a 
challenged peremptory strike can be "silly or superstitious;" if 
such explanation is believed, the strike must be upheld by the 
trial court. Purkett v. Elam, fn. 3 of this brief, 115 S. Ct. at 
1771. 
10 
therefore uphold the trial court's finding that the State 
peremptorily removed Mrs. Gonzales for race-neutral reasons. 
C. Panelist Adrian Sampson. 
Prospective juror Sampson, an African-American (R. 
231) , stated during voir dire that even his attendance at the 
relatively brief, two-day trial could have difficult financial 
consequences. Paid by commission for his employment, and nearing 
the end of his probationary period, Mr. Sampson had "quite a bit 
of money on the line" that required his close attention at the 
time (R. 208-09) . Additionally, Mr. Sampson acknowledged his 
personal acquaintance with some lawyers employed by the Salt Lake 
Legal Defender Association (R. 222-23) . For these reasons, the 
prosecutor peremptorily struck Mr. Sampson: 
And the concern was, is that if he's chosen and 
that if he spends most of his time worrying about 
his work, he'll spend [sic: less?] time worrying 
about this particular case. He, in great detail, 
went into why he would consider it a hardship. 
Additionally, he stated that he knew people 
at L.D.A., specifically Richard Uday, and he knew 
Andrew Valdez before he became a judge. 
(R. 231). 
Bingham asserts that another prospective juror, Mrs. 
Davie, had similar employment concerns yet was not peremptorily 
removed, suggesting that the prosecutor's concerns about Mr. 
Sampson were pretextual (Br. of Appellant at 27). In fact, 
however, Davie's job concern was not so strong as that of Mr. 
Sampson: she merely reported that in her job as a clothing sales 
clerk, she had to preside over a sale beginning at 5:00 p.m. each 
11 
day of trial (R. 209-10). And Mrs. Davie, unlike Sampson, had no 
association with criminal defense lawyers. The prosecutor 
therefore acted reasonably in striking Mr. Sampson, while leaving 
Mrs. Davie on the jury. 
The trial court, in turn, was permitted to believe the 
prosecutor's race-neutral explanation for striking Mr. Sampson. 
On appeal, Bingham only argues that certain factors "support Mr. 
Bingham's position" or "suggest[]" that the prosecutor's 
explanation was false (Br. of Appellant at 26-27). Such 
arguments, while properly made in the trial court, do not meet 
the "clear error" standard for appellate reversal.5 Again, the 
trial court's on-scene advantage in assessing the prosecutor's 
credibility must prevail. Accordingly, this Court must affirm 
the trial court's finding that the State struck Mr. Sampson, like 
Ms. Gonzales, for race-neutral reasons. 
POINT TWO 
IN OVERRULING BINGHAM'S OBJECTION TO THE 
PROSECUTOR'S ALLEGED MISSTATEMENT OF LAW, THE 
TRIAL COURT NEITHER ERRED NOR CAUSED 
PREJUDICE TO THE DEFENSE 
Bingham next complains that the prosecutor misstated 
the law during closing argument. The challenged statement 
5Bingham's appellate analysis, applying the tests set forth 
for Batson challenges in Span, 819 P. 2d at 342, and Cantu, 778 P. 2d 
at 518, is really a more elaborate form of his trial court 
argument. Because he makes no claim that the trial court stepped 
outside the "pasture" created by those cases, State v. Pena, 869 
P.2d 932, 939-40 n.5 (Utah 1994), Bingham's argument cannot 
establish clear error in the trial court's resolution of his Batson 
objections. Cf. A. Kozinski, The Wrong Stuff, 1992 B.Y.U. L. REV. 
325, 333 ("jury argument" on appeal does not prevail). 
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involved the distinction between theft, which requires intent to 
permanently deprive a person of their property, Utah Code Ann. § 
76-6-401(3), -404 (1995), and "joyriding," Utah Code Ann. §§ 41-
la-1311, -1314 (1993) (all copied in the appendix to this brief), 
which only involves temporary deprivation.6 According to 
Bingham, the following prosecutor argument improperly suggested 
that a twenty-four hour period governed the distinction between 
theft and joyriding: 
Mr. Bingham has told you yes, he intended to go 
down and get the drugs and then abandon the 
vehicle. 
So basically, Mr. Bingham has convicted 
himself of count 2 [(instr. 20)], the unlawful 
possession and the unlawful, or the unlawful 
control over a motor vehicle, a class A. No 
question. 
But that's where he wants you to stop and 
that's where the people of Utah don't want you to 
stop. We want you to look at [instr.] No. 18 and 
come back with a verdict of guilty because he 
intended to deprive the owner of that motor 
vehicle. Why? How? First of all, as you heard 
me just explain, unlawful control over a motor 
vehicle in the legal jargon is called joy-riding. 
Joy-riding is where, generally, a couple of kids 
see a motor vehicle, many cases just like this, at 
a convenience store, somebody's run in, left the 
motor running, the key's in there, they grab it, 
they drive over to a friend's house, they ride 
around town for a little bit and they abandon it 
within a 24-hour period. 
(R. 352) . Bingham objected to the foregoing argument, asserting, 
"That's not the state of the law" (id.). The trial court 
6The formal legal term for "joyriding" is "unlawful control 
over motor vehicles, trailers, or semitrailers." Utah Code Ann. §§ 
41-la-1311, -1314 (1993) . 
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overruled the objection, stating that the prosecutor was arguing 
the application of the jury instructions (R. 352-53). 
A. The Standard of Review. 
The question whether a prosecutor misstated the law can 
properly be reviewed without deference to the trial court. See, 
e.g., State v. Boyatt, 854 P.2d 550, 554-55 (Utah App.), cert. 
denied, 862 P.2d 1356 (Utah 1993). However, attorneys are given 
"considerable latitude in closing argument." State v. Cummins, 
839 P.2d 848, 852 (Utah App. 1992) (citing State v. Dibello, 780 
P.2d 1221, 1225 (Utah 1989)), cert, denied, 853 P.2d 897 (Utah 
1993). Accordingly, counsel efforts to illustrate the meaning of 
an instruction to a trial jury ought to allow similar latitude. 
Additionally, when a trial court is asked to grant a 
mistrial based upon prosecutor misconduct, its resolution of such 
request is reviewed under a deferential "abuse of discretion" 
standard. See, e.g., State v. Hay, 859 P.2d 1, 6 (Utah 1993); 
State v. Speer, 750 P.2d 186, 190 (Utah 1988); State v. Gardner, 
789 P.2d 273, 287 (Utah 1989), cert, denied, 494 U.S. 1090 
(1990); Cummins, 839 P.2d at 853. A similar standard should 
apply to rulings on objections, short of a mistrial request, to 
alleged misstatements. Cf. State v. Tillman, 750 P.2d 546, 561 
(Utah 1987) (upon timely objection, trial court can correct 
erroneous argument by curative instruction or by declaring 
mistrial) . Such deference is also implicit in the appellate test 
for whether counsel's comments warrant reversal: "[D]id the 
remarks call to the attention of the jurors matters which they 
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would not be justified in considering . . . , and were they, under 
the circumstances, probably influenced by those remarks." State 
v. Troy, 688 P.2d 483, 486 (Utah 1984) (followed in Cummins, 839 
P.2d at 852)). 
Also implicit in the Troy test for improper prosecutor 
comments is a harmless error test. Therefore, even if this Court 
finds error in the trial court's discretionary ruling, it must 
nevertheless affirm Bingham's conviction unless he proves 
prejudice; i.e., that but for the error, there is a reasonable 
likelihood of a more defense-favorable verdict. State v. Verde, 
770 P.2d 116, 120-22 (Utah 1989); Utah R. Crim. P. 30(a). As 
follows, the trial court properly denied Bingham's objection to 
the prosecutor's argument. However, even if the court erred, 
such error was not prejudicial. 
B. No Abuse of Discretion. 
In fact, the prosecutor correctly stated the law of 
"joyriding" as applied to the facts of this case. The jury was 
instructed to consider the lesser-included offense of class A 
misdemeanor joyriding, Utah Code Ann. § 41-la-1311 (1993) , if it 
could not find Bingham guilty of theft (R. 133 (instr. 20)). 
Joyriding, however, becomes a third degree felony under section 
41-la-1314 if the offender "does not return the motor vehicle . . 
. to the owner or lawful custodian within 24 hours after the 
exercise of unauthorized control." Because Bingham only kept Ms. 
Redmon's Datsun for about seven hours before he was apprehended, 
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the prosecutor's closing argument accurately defined misdemeanor 
"joyriding" to the jury. 
Given the wide latitude permitted in closing argument, 
the prosecutor also legitimately illustrated joyriding by its 
most familiar example--young people "borrowing" an automobile 
without permission. Utilizing the evidence in this case, the 
prosecutor then distinguished common joyriding from Bingham's 
actions--which included switching the license plates and covering 
the distinctive window sticker (R. 356). He went on to argue 
that Bingham's claimed intention to abandon the Datsun was self-
serving and not credible, given that he was apprehended while 
still driving it, far from where he purportedly intended to 
abandon it (R. 354, 357, 360). 
Under these circumstances, the trial court did not 
abuse its discretion by overruling Bingham's objection to the 
prosecutor's argument. The court properly allowed latitude for 
both parties' counsel to argue the only disputed issue in the 
case--whether Bingham took the Datsun with intent to permanently, 
or only temporarily, deprive Ms. Redmon. This Court should 
affirm, not second-guess, the trial court's judgment call on this 
point. See State v. Richardson, 843 P.2d 517, 524-25 (Utah App. 
1992) (Bench, P.J., concurring). 
C. Hannlessness of Alleged Error. 
Attempting to prove that the prosecutor's allegedly 
improper argument prejudiced the defense, Bingham misrelies on 
the jury's brief confusion, shown in a note to the court during 
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deliberations, about the time period necessary to differentiate 
theft from "joyriding" (Br. of Appellant at 31) . The jury asked 
whether "permanent" deprivation of the rightful owner's property 
was marked by a period of more than twenty-four hours (R. 146). 
Based upon that jury inquiry, Bingham argues that but for the 
prosecutor's reference to a twenty-four hour period, the jury 
would have found him guilty of joyriding, not theft. 
Bingham is mistaken. The prosecutor's comment could 
only have prejudiced the State, not Bingham. It was undisputed 
that Bingham only kept the Datsun for about seven hours. The 
prosecutor's "twenty-four hours" comment therefore would have 
suggested to the jury that Bingham could not have committed 
theft, but only joyriding. Fortunately for the State, the jury 
ultimately understood that the question whether Bingham intended 
to permanently deprive Ms. Redmon of her Datsun, a matter 
addressing only Bingham's state of mind, was independent of how 
long he actually had possession of the vehicle. In other words, 
had the prosecutor never mentioned a twenty-four hour period, 
there is no reasonable likelihood of a more defense-favorable 
verdict; instead, the jury would have reached its theft verdict 
more easily and rapidly. 
And Bingham grossly understates the strength of the 
evidence supporting the jury's verdict (Br. of Appellant at 31). 
In addition to switching the license plates and covering the 
window sticker, there was ample additional evidence of Bingham's 
intent to permanently deprive Ms. Redmon of her automobile. By 
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admitting that he shoplifted and then sold cigarettes on the 
evening in question, Bingham painted himself as a thief (R. 313-
14, 324-25). Filling the Datsun's gas tank (R. 254, never 
asserted as an altruistic act) also supported the inference that 
Bingham had no intention to return it. 
Bingham's admission that he needed a vehicle on a daily 
basis, yet had abandoned his own nonfunctioning automobile (R. 
333-34, 340-41), also supported a finding that he intended to 
steal the Datsun. Bingham stole and sold cigarettes to purchase 
heroin; a similar fate could be anticipated for the Datsun. 
Finally, by giving a false name to the arresting officer (R. 
263), Bingham revealed himself as a liar. All this evidence 
permitted the jury to reject Bingham's protestations that he only 
intended to use Ms. Redmon's vehicle temporarily. In sum, 
Bingham shows neither error nor prejudice in the trial court's 
resolution of his objection to the prosecutor's argument. 
POINT THREE 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY REJECTED BINGHAM'S 
CONTENTION THAT BECAUSE ONE PROSPECTIVE JUROR 
HAD SEEN BINGHAM WEARING JAIL GARB, THE JURY 
WAS PREJUDICED AGAINST HIM 
In his final point on appeal, Bingham requests a new 
trial because a prospective juror had apparently viewed him 
wearing jail clothing. During open voir dire, panelist DeRosier 
revealed that she had seen Bingham thus clad in another court (R. 
198-200; Br. of Appellant at 7-8). Upon Bingham's sidebar 
objection, the trial court admonished the panelists that such 
sighting of Bingham did not signify guilt of any crime, much less 
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the charges in question. The panelists uniformly indicated that 
they would obey that admonition (R. 201-02; Br. of Appellant at 
8-9). The trial court excused panelist DeRosier for cause, and 
denied Bingham's subsequent mistrial motion, made in chambers and 
based upon DeRosier's prior sighting (R. 103, 236).7 
A. The Standard of Review. 
Utah appellate courts review trial court rulings on 
mistrial motions under the deferential, "abuse of discretion" 
standard. State v. Menzies, 889 P.2d 393, 401 (Utah 1994), cert. 
denied, 115 S. Ct. 910 (1995); State v. Wetzel, 868 P.2d 64, 70 
(Utah 1993); State v. Gordon, 886 P.2d 112, 115 (Utah App. 1994); 
State v. Morgan, 865 P.2d 1377, 1381 (Utah App. 1993); State v. 
Pearson, 818 P.2d 581, 582 (Utah App. 1991). The reviewing 
courts have therefore upheld the denial of mistrial motions in 
cases where jurors viewed the defendant in shackles during a 
trial recess, Wetzel, 868 P.2d at 70; where a seated juror made 
an improperly prejudicial comment to another juror, Morgan, 865 
P.2d at 1381; and where a juror allegedly gave an inaccurate 
response to voir dire questioning, State v. Ewell, 883 P.2d 1360, 
1362 (Utah App. 1993) . This Court has incorporated a "fair 
trial" inquiry into such review. E.g., State v. Burk, 839 P.2d 
7In chambers, the trial court observed that counsel had not 
requested a mistrial when objecting at sidebar (R. 235). While 
this Court may affirm the trial court's apparent waiver ruling, the 
State opts, in main text, to brief this point on the merits. 
The State infers that DeRosier was excused for cause from the 
main record, which contains the notation "excused" next to 
DeRosier's name, followed by the trial judge's initials (R. 103). 
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880, 883 (Utah App. 1992), cert, denied, 853 P.2d 897 (Utah 
1993); State v. Boone, 820 P.2d 930, 935-36 (Utah App. 1991). 
B. No Abuse of Discretion. 
Comparison of this case to similar situations confirms 
that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying 
Bingham's mistrial motion. In Wetzel, for example, mistrial was 
properly denied even though an actually seated juror and an 
alternate juror viewed the defendant in shackles during a trial 
recess. In this case, no seated juror saw Bingham in jail 
clothing; there was only a prior sighting by a panelist who did 
not sit. In Morgan, mistrial was properly denied when a seated 
juror made a "poor taste" comment, suggestive of the defendant's 
guilt, to an alternate juror; replacement of the commenting juror 
with the alternate juror cured the problem.8 In this case, 
panelist DeRosier never commented about Bingham's guilt or 
innocence; her for-cause removal also removed any possible 
prejudice from having previously viewed him in jail garb. 
The sound exercise of the trial court's discretion in 
this case is further confirmed by the curative admonition given 
to the panelists. The court made it abundantly clear that jurors 
were not to be influenced by DeRosier's sighting of Bingham in 
jail clothing. Polled by show of hands, no panelist expressed 
any difficulty with that simple directive. Compare Dickson v. 
State, 822 P.2d 1122, 1123 (Nev. 1992) (prospective juror saw the 
8A seated juror also overheard the derogatory comment in 
Morgan; like the alternate juror, she reaffirmed her impartiality, 
and remained on the jury. 865 P.2d at 1381. 
20 
accused in shackles; one juror admitted that it would be "hard" 
to fairly weigh the evidence as a result). This Court should 
affirm the denial of Bingham's mistrial motion on this point. 
C Harmless Error. 
Even if this Court could find error in the trial 
court's judgment, it could not find reversal-warranting harm in 
such error. The Utah Supreme Court has held that a juror's brief 
view of a defendant wearing handcuffs does not require reversal 
unless the defendant affirmatively proves prejudice. Wetzel, 868 
P.2d at 70 (citing authorities). It so held notwithstanding 
Chess v. Smith, 617 P.2d 341, 344-45 (Utah 1980), which held that 
the right to be tried in non-jail attire is a constitutional 
right. Because in this case Bingham was tried in non-jail 
attire, and was only viewed wearing jail garb in another court, 
the Wetzel standard for harmless error applies. 
Under this standard, Bingham has not shown, and cannot 
show, prejudice sufficient to require reversal of his conviction. 
The for-cause removal of panelist DeRosier, and the trial court's 
admonition that jurors were to disregard her prior sighting of 
Bingham in jail garb, adequately cured any prejudice thereby 
caused. See Menzies, 889 P.2d at 401 (applying presumption that 
jurors followed admonition to disregard improper testimony). 
Additionally, any such prejudice was de minimus compared to that 
wrought by Bingham's own testimony. In that testimony, Bingham 
admitted heroin addiction, shoplifting, taking the Datsun and 
switching its license plates, and driving while intoxicated on 
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heroin (R. 313-14, 324, 328). In effect, he thereby stripped 
away his own "garb of innocence," Kennedy v. Cardwell, 487 F.2d 
101, 105 (6th Cir. 1973) . 
In short, the jury's knowledge that Bingham had been 
previously seen wearing jail clothing did not influence the 
verdict in this case.9 Putting the matter as stated by this 
Court in Burk and Boone, Bingham had a fair trial. On this 
alternative, harmless error basis, Bingham's appellate argument 
on this point cannot prevail. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, this Court should AFFIRM 
Bingham's criminal convictions. Because this case is resolvable 
under already-settled law, neither oral argument nor published 
opinion is necessary. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 0^( day of August, 1995. 
JAN GRAHAM 
Attorney General 
J. KEVIN MURPHY 
Assistant Attorney General 
9The same result would be reached even under the stringent, 
"harmless beyond reasonable doubt" standard for constitutional 
error. See Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967); State v. 
Verde, 770 P.2d 116, 120-22 (Utah 1989). Bingham's own testimony 
was so overwhelmingly self-harmful that Ms. DeRosier's prior 
sighting of him, known by the jury, was trivial. 
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PART4 
THEFT 
76-6*401. Definitions. 
For the purposes of this part: 
(1) "Property* means anything of value, including real estate, tangible 
and intangible personal property, captured or domestic animals and birds, 
written instruments or other writings representing or embodying rights 
concerning real or personal property, labor, services, or otherwise contain-
ing anything of value to the owner, commodities of a public utility nature 
such as telecommunications, gas, electricity, steam, or water, and trade 
secrets, meaning the whole or any portion of any scientific or technical 
information, design, process, procedure, formula or invention which the 
owner thereof intends to be available only to persons selected by him. 
(2) "Obtain" means, in relation to property, to bring about a transfer of 
possession or of some other legally recognized interest in property, 
whether to the obtainer or another; in relation to labor or services, to 
secure performance thereof; and in relation to a trade secret, to make any 
facsimile, replica, photograph, or other reproduction. 
(3) "Purpose to deprive" means to have the conscious object: 
(a) lb withhold property permanently or for so extended a period or 
to use under such circumstances that a substantial portion of its 
economic value, or of the use and benefit thereof, would be lost; or 
(fa lb restore the property only upon payment of a reward or other 
compensation; or 
(c) lb dispose of the property under circumstances that make it 
unlikely that the owner will recover it. 
(4) "Obtain or exercise unauthorized control" means, but is not neces-
sarily limited to, conduct heretofore defined or known as common-law 
larceny by trespassory taking, larceny by conversion, larceny by bailee, 
and embezzlement. 
(5) "Deception" occurs when a person intentionally: 
(a) Creates or confirms by words or conduct an impression of law or 
fact that is false and that the actor does not believe to be true and that 
is likely to affect the judgment of another in the transaction; or 
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(b) Fails to correct a false impression of law or fact that the actor 
previously created or confirmed by words or conduct that is likely to 
affect the judgment of another and that the actor does not now believe 
to be true; or 
(c) Prevents another from acquiring information likely to affect his 
judgment in the transaction; or 
(d) Sells or otherwise transfers or encumbers property without 
disclosing a lien, security interest, adverse claim, or other legal 
impediment to the enjoyment of the property, whether the lien, 
security interest, claim, or impediment is or is not valid or is or is not 
a matter of official record; or 
(e) Promises performance that is likely to affect the judgment of 
another in the transaction, which performance the actor does not 
intend to perform or knows will not be performed; provided, however, 
that failure to perform the promise in issue without other evidence of 
intent or knowledge is not sufficient proof that the actor did not intend 
to perform or knew the promise would not be performed. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
History: C. 1953, 76-6-401, enacted by L. 
1973, ch. 196,1 76-6-401. 
ANALYSIS 
Deception. 
Purpose to deprive. 
Cited. 
Deception. 
Subsection (a) in the definition of "deception" 
only applies to impressions offset that are false 
at some present time; unfulfilled promises of 
future performance do not suffice as false rep-
resentations under that* subsection. State v. 
Lakey, 659 R2d 1061 (Utah 4983). 
Under Subsection (b) in the definition of 
"deception," the previously created or confirmed 
impression of fact must be false when the 
property is obtained in order to constitute "de-
ception." State v. Lakey, 659 P.2d 1061 (Utah 
1983). 
Under Subsection (e) in the definition of 
"deception/ a promise of future performance 
can constitute deception when the promising 
party does not intend to perform or knows the 
promise will not be performed; a person knows 
that a promise will not be performed when he is 
aware that the promise is reasonably certain 
not to be performed. State v. Lakey, 659 P.2d 
1061 (Utah 1983). 
Defendant's false representations to a bank 
employee about his account and line of credit at 
other banks were sufficient to support finding 
of deception. State v. LeFevre, 825 P.2d 681 
(Utah Ct. App.), cert, denied, 843 P.2d 1042 
(Utah 1992). 
Purpose to deprive. 
Evidence was sufficient to establish defen-
dant's intent to deprive owner of his automobile 
where defendant drove the automobile in ex-
cess of 100 miles per hour when fleeing from 
police; told police when stopped that he owned 
the automobile; damaged the automobile by 
misuse; and drove the car from Utah to Califor-
nia without ever stating he would return the 
automobile to Utah. State v. Daniels, 584 P.2d 
880 (Utah 1978). 
The defendant's "purpose to deprive" was 
inferred from the following facts: in 1984, de-
fendant began borrowing small amounts of 
money from the victim to buy pet food; the 
victim's generosity prompted defendant to 
make subsequent requests for larger sums to 
pay for everything from automobile repairs to 
medical bills; with each request, defendant in-
evitably promised to repay the victim soon or by 
a specific date; and between 1984 and 1986, 
defendant borrowed over $70,000 and repaid 
only about $1,500. State v. Fowler, 745 P.2d 472 
(Utah Ct. App. 1987). 
Cited in Stevens v. Sanpete County, 640 F. 
Supp. 376 (D. Utah 1986). 
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court properly refused to give an instruction 
proffered by defendant State v. Larsen, 876 
R2d 391 (Utah Ct. App. 1994). 
Pleading and practice. 
Section 76-6-404 is the "general offense of 
theft" required to be pled by this section to 
invoke the provisions of consolidated theft. 
Once the prosecution charges a defendant with 
the general offense of theft" under } 76-6-404, 
it may then present its evidence to prove the 
76-6-404. Theft — Elements. 
History: C. 1953, 76-6-404, enacted by L. 
1973, ch. 196, § 76-6-404. 
Cross-References. — Motor vehicles, spe-
ANALYSIS 
Bailments. 
Comment on defendant's silence. 
Corpus delicti. 
Elements of offense. 
Evidence. 
—Weight and sufficiency. 
Included offenses. 
—Possession. 
Instructions. 
Intent. 
Pleading and practice. 
Possession of recently stolen property. 
"Purpose to deprive." 
Separate offenses. 
Unauthorized control. 
Venue. 
Cited. 
Bailments. 
Bailor could be guilty of stealing his own 
property, if done with intent to charge bailee. 
State v. Parker, 104 Utah 23, 137 P.2d 626 
(1943). 
Comment on defendant's silence. 
Where defendant charged with theft of build-
ing materials from construction site did not 
testify in his own defense and offered no evi-
dence to explain his late-night presence at the 
site, prosecutor's comment that: "The defense 
has presented no evidence as to why defendant 
was out there. What was he doing out there?" 
was a legitimate comment on what the total 
evidence did or did not show; it was not imper-
missible comment on defendant's failure to tes-
tify. State v. Kazda, 540 P.2d 949 (Utah 1975). 
theft was committed in any manner specified in 
it 76-6-404 to 76-6-410. State v. Fowler, 745 
P.2d 472 (Utah Ct. App. 1987). 
Receiving stolen property. 
Evidence that establishes receiving stolen 
property under $ 76-6-408 is sufficient to sus-
tain a conviction of theft without the necessity 
of establishing theft by taking. State v. Taylor, 
570 P.2d 697 (Utah 1977). 
cial anti-theft laws, $ 41-la-1308 et seq. 
Shoplifting Act, } 78-11-14 et seq. 
Corpus d e l i c t i 
In prosecution fbrterceny it was not essential 
that corpus delicti be established by evidence 
independent of that adduced to prove that de-
fendant was perpetrator of crime; the same 
evidence could be used to prove both. State v. 
Hall, 105 Utah 151, 139 P.2d 228 (1943), rev'd 
on other grounds, 105 Utah 162, 145 P.2d 494 
(1944). 
Corpus delicti for offense of theft consists of 
the elements that one entitled to possession of 
the property has been deprived of possession 
and such deprivation has been accomplished by 
a felonious taking; evidence of the property 
having been taken from the possession of the 
owner without his knowledge or consent is 
evidence of both of the elements of the corpus 
delicti. State v. Chesnut, 621 P. 2d 1228 (Utah 
1980). 
Elements of offense. 
State is not required to prove conclusively 
who the real owner of the property is, but only 
that defendant obtained or exercised unautho-
rized control over the property of another. State 
v. Simmons, 573 P.2d 341 (Utah 1977). 
This section requires a finding of only one of 
two disjunctives, "obtained" or "exercised unau-
thorized control" over the property of another 
with a purpose to deprive him thereof; convic-
tion for theft can be upheld without a finding 
that defendant "obtained" the property, so long 
as there is a finding that he "exercised unau-
thorized control" over it. State v. Walker, 649 
P.2d 16 (Utah 1982). 
Evidence. 
Proof of identity of stolen goods could be by 
either direct or circumstantial evidence. State 
A person commits theft if he obtains or exercises unauthorized control over 
the property of another with a purpose to deprive him thereof. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
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COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. JUT. Id. — 50 Am. Jur. 2d Larceny CJ&. — 52A C.J.S. Larceny § 18. | 101. Key Numbers. — Larceny *» 10. 
76-6*408. Receiving stolen property — Duties of pawnbro-
kers. 
(1) A person commits theft if he receives, retains, or disposes of the property 
of another knowing that it has been stolen, or believing that it probably has 
been stolen, or who conceals, sells, withholds or aids in concealing, selling, or 
withholding the property from the owner, knowing the property to be stolen, 
intending to deprive the owner of it. 
(2) The knowledge or belief required for Subsection (1) is presumed in the 
case of an actor who: 
(a) is found in possession or control of other property stolen on a 
separate occasion; 
(b) has received other stolen property within the year preceding the 
receiving offense charged; 
(c) being a dealer in property of the sort received, retained, or disposed, 
acquires it for a consideration which he knows is far below its reasonable 
value; or 
(d) if the value given for the property exceeds $20, is a pawnbroker or 
person who has or operates a business dealing in or collecting used or 
secondhand merchandise or personal property, or an agent, employee, or 
representative of a pawnbroker or person who buys, receives, or obtains 
property and fails to require the seller or person delivering the property to: 
(i) certify, in writing, that he has the legal rights to sell the 
property; 
(ii) provide a legible print, preferably the right thumb, at the 
bottom of the certificate next to his signature; and 
(iii) provide at least one other positive form of picture identifica-
tion. 
(3) Every pawnbroker or person who has or operates a business dealing in 
or collecting used or secondhand merchandise or personal property, and every 
agent, employee, or representative of a pawnbroker or person who fails to 
comply with the requirements of Subsection (2)(d) shall be presumed to have 
bought, received, or obtained the property knowing it to have been stolen or 
unlawfully obtained. This presumption may be rebutted by proof. 
(4) When, in a prosecution under this section, it appears from the evidence 
that the defendant was a pawnbroker or a person who has or operates a 
business dealing in or collecting used or secondhand merchandise or personal 
property, or was an agent, employee, or representative of a pawnbroker or 
person, that the defendant bought, received, concealed, or withheld the 
property without obtaining the information required in Subsection (2Xd), then 
the burden shall be upon the defendant to show that the property bought, 
received, or obtained was not stolen. 
(5) Subsections (2Xd), (3), and (4) do not apply to scrap metal processors as 
defined in Section 76-10-901. 
(6) As used in this section: 
(a) "Receives" means acquiring possession, control, or title or lending on 
the security of the property; 
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(b) "Dealer" means a person in the business of buying or selling goods. 
History: C. 1963, 76-6-406, enacted by L. 
1973, ch. 196, I 76-6-408; 1979, ch. 71, I 1; 
1993, ch. 102, ft 1. 
Amendment Notes. — The 1993 amend-
ment, effective May 3, 1993, substituted "Sub-
section" for "paragraph" in Subsection (2), sub-
divided Subsection (2Xd), moved "if the value 
given for the property exceeds $20" which was 
formerly in Subsection (2XdXi) to the introduc-
tory language, inserted "picture" in Subsection 
(2XdXiii), redesignated former Subsections 
(2XdXi) and (ii) as Subsections (3) and (4), 
inserted Subsection (5), making a correspond-
ing designation change, and made stylistic 
changes. 
Cross-References. — Pawnbrokers and sec-
ondhand dealers, ft 11-6-1 et seq. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
Constitutionality. 
Applicability. 
Elements. 
—Concealing stolen property. 
—Receiving stolen property. 
Entrapment. 
Evidence. 
Intent. 
Prima facie case. 
Separate offenses. 
Cited. 
Constitutionality. 
The presumption created in Subsection (2) is 
constitutional when read in light of ft 76-1-503, 
which provides that a presumption means only 
that the issue of the presumed fact must be 
submitted to the jury unless its existence is 
clearly negated and that the jury may treat 
proof of the underlying facts as evidence of the 
presumed fact, but does not disturb the require-
ment that the presumed fact, like all other 
elements of the crime, must be proved beyond a 
reasonable doubt. State v. Mullins, 549 P.2d 454 
(Utah 1976). 
The phrase "believing that it probably has 
been stolen" in Subsection (1), while not a 
model of draftsmanship, is not unconstitution-
ally vague. State v. Plum, 552 P.2d 124 (Utah 
1976). 
Applicability. 
The plain meaning of Subsection (2Xd) limits 
its application to pawnbrokers and similar 
businesses that generally deal in small pur-
chases of secondhand consumer goods. It does 
not include businesses that regularly deal in 
large bulk orders of raw industrial material. 
Alta Indus. Ltd. v. Hurst, 646 P.2d 1282 (Utah 
1993). 
Elements. 
—Concealing stolen property. 
The elements in the crime of concealing or 
aiding in the concealment of stolen property 
are: (1) property belonging to another has been 
stolen; (2) the defendant aided in concealing 
this property; (3) at the time he so aided in 
concealing it he knew the item had been stolen; 
and (4) his purpose in acting was to deprive the 
owner thereof of possession. State v. Lamm, 606 
P.2d 229 (Utah 1980). 
—Receiving stolen property. 
Elements of the crime of receiving stolen 
property are.^ ppQperty belonging to another has 
been stolen< the defendant received, retained or 
disposed of the stolen property; at the time of 
receiving, retaining or disposing of the property 
the defendant knew or believed the property 
was stolen; and the defendant acted purposely 
to deprive the owner of the possession of the 
property. State v. Murphy, 617 P.2d 399 (Utah 
1980). 
Time of the alleged offense is not an essential 
element of the crime of receiving stolen prop-
erty; state's proof that offense occurred on a 
date different than that alleged in the informa-
tion was not fatal to defendant's conviction for 
receiving stolen property where the applicable 
limitations statute had not run at the time the 
charge was filed. State v. Wilson, 642 P.2d 394 
(Utah 1982). 
In order to obtain a conviction for theft by 
receiving, the state must prove beyond a rea-
sonable doubt each of the following elements: 
(1) The defendant received, retained, or dis-
posed of the property of another, (2) knowing 
that the property had been stolen or believing 
that it probably had been stolen, (3) with the 
purpose to deprive the owner thereof. State v. 
Hill, 727 P.2d 221 (Utah 1986). 
Entrapment. 
Trial court properly found entrapment in a 
"sting" operation involving use of an attractive 
female undercover police officer to sell stolen 
merchandise to a jewelry store owner who may 
have been encouraged to suggest that his rela-
tionship with the officer become more intimate. 
State v. Kaufman, 734 P.2d 465 (Utah 1987). 
Evidence. 
Evidence establishing receiving stolen prop-
205 
MOTOR VEHICLE ACT 4Ma-1311 
"mileage" in Subsection (l)(f); added Subsec- tion (2) listing violations constituting second 
tion (l)(g); and made related changes. degree felonies; and made stylistic changes. 
The 1991 amendment, effective April 29, The 1992 amendment by ch. 218, amending 
1991, substituted "class B" for "class A" near t n i s section as renumbered and amended by 
the beginning of Subsection (1). ^a™ 1^92 ch. 1, effective July 1,1992 deleted 
The 1992 amendment by ch. 1, effective Jan- °* ° P ' ™ f „ w r t l * <**?* u*? after certifi-
o« ^0^0 L J ^ ^L- i-- u cate of title in Subsection (1). 
ua iy30 ,1992 ,nmumber^^ Compiler's Notes. - Laws 1992, ch. 1, 
formerly appeared as § 41-1-173; deleted the
 § 2 1 3 ^ ^ wtf ^ b m ^ g B 2 9 [ c h 
subsection designation (1) at the beginning; m- 2345
 M o t o r V e h i c l e Business Regulation Act, 
serted present Subsection (1); redesignated for- ^ t h
 p a s 8 i n ^ 1 9 9 2 General Session, it is the 
mer Subsections (lKa) through (l)(g) as intent of the Legislature that this bill should 
present Subsections (2) through (8); substi- be amended as follows: (1) In Section 
tuted the present code citations in Subsections 41-la-1310 '41-3-2' shall be deleted and 
(2) and (8) for "Section 41-1-169" and the '41-3-301' inserted." 
present code citations in Subsections (5) and (6) Cross-References. — Sentencing for misde-
for "Section 41-1-172"; deleted former Subsec- meanors, §§ 76-3-201, 76-3-204, 76-3-301. 
41-la-1311. Unlawful control over motor vehicles, trailers, 
or semitrailers — Penalties — Effect of prior con-
sent — Accessory or accomplice. 
(1) It is a class A misdemeanor for a person to exercise unauthorized control 
over a motor vehicle, trailer, or semitrailer not his own, without the consent of 
the owner or lawful custodian and with intent to temporarily deprive the 
owner or lawful custodian of possession of the motor vehicle, trailer, or semi-
trailer. 
(2) The consent of the owner or legal custodian of a motor vehicle, trailer, or 
semitrailer to its control by the actor is not in any case presumed or implied 
because of the owner's or legal custodian's consent on a previous occasion to 
the control of the motor vehicle, trailer, or semitrailer by the same or a differ-
ent person. 
(3) Any person who assists in, or is a party or accessory to or an accomplice 
in, an unauthorized taking or driving is guilty of a class A misdemeanor. 
History: L. 1935, ch. 46, § 100; 1941, ch. leted former Subsection (2) which made an of-
50, § 1; 1941 (2nd S.S.), ch. 12, § 1; C. 1943, fense under the section a third-degree felony if 
57-3a.H0; L. 1983, ch. 190, 5 2; 1986, ch. 32, the vehicle was not returned within 24 hours; 
§ 1; 198Vch. 92, § 52; C. 1953, *1£109; re- redesignated former Subsections (3) and (4) as 
"X^mSt No^-Ve Unamend- Subsection. (2) and (3); and made stylistic 
ment, effective January 30, 1992, renumbered "la^&e8-
this section, which formerly appeared as Cross-References. — Sentencing for misde-
§ 41-1-109; substituted "motor vehicle, trailer, meanors, §§ 76-3-201, 76-3-204, 76-3-301. 
or semitrailer" for "vehicle" in three places; de-
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS —Lesser included offense. 
Constitutionality. Constitutionality. 
Attempts to commit crime. Former act (Laws 1921, ch. 81) relating to 
Auto insurance. identification number on vehicles was not ren-
—Theft." dered unconstitutional as containing more 
Elements. than one subject by inclusion therein of provi-
Jury instructions. sion making it offense to drive away automo-
—Intent. bile of another. State v. Olson, 59 Utah 549, 
Theft. 205 P. 337 (1922). 
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41-la-1313. Third degree felony to possess motor vehicle, 
trailer, semitrailer, or parts without identifica-
tion number — Presumption of knowledge. 
(1) It is a third degree felony for a person to have in his possession any 
motor vehicle, trailer, or semitrailer, or any part or parts of a motor vehicle, 
trailer, or semitrailer, from which any identification number has been re-
moved, defaced, destroyed, obliterated, or so covered as to be concealed, or 
where the identification number has been altered or changed in any manner. 
(2) A person having possession of any motor vehicle, trailer, or semitrailer 
or part of them under this section is presumed prima facie to have knowledge 
of this condition. 
History: L. 1935, ch. 46, ft 113; C. 1943, The 1992 amendment, effective January 30, 
57-3a-114; L. 1989, ch. 274, § 21; C. 1953, 1992, renumbered this section, which formerly 
41-1-110; renumbered by L. 1992, ch. 1, appeared as § 41-1-110; inserted "trailer, or 
i 170. semitrailer" in three places; substituted "iden-
Amendment Notes. — The 1989 amend- tification number" for "trademark, distin-
ment, effective April 24, 1989, inserted the guishing or identification number, manufac-
subsection designations; substituted "a third turer's number, or serial number" in two 
degree felony" for "unlawful" near the begin- places; and made stylistic changes. 
ning of Subsection (1); and made stylistic Cross-Reference*. — Sentencing for felo-
changes. nies, §§ 76-3-fOl, 76-13-203, 76-3-301. 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
C.J.S. — 61A CJ.S. Motor Vehicles § 688. 
Key Numbers. — Automobiles *» 316, 340. 
41-la-1314. Third degree felony to exercise unauthorized 
control for extended time. 
(1) It is a third degree felony to exercise unauthorized control over a motor 
vehicle, trailer, or semitrailer if the person does not return the motor vehicle, 
trailer, or semitrailer to the owner or lawful custodian within 24 hours after 
the exercise of unauthorized control. 
(2) The consent of the owner or legal custodian of a motor vehicle, trailer, or 
semitrailer to its control by the actor is not in any case presumed or implied 
because of the owner's or legal custodian's consent on a previous occasion to 
the control of the motor vehicle, trailer, or semitrailer by the same or a differ-
ent person. 
History: C. 1953, 41-U-1314, enacted by Utah Const., Art. VI, Sec. 25. 
L. 1992, ch. 1, i 171. Cross-References. — Sentencing for felo-
Effective Date*. — Laws 1992, ch. 1 became nies, §§ 76-3-201, 76-3-203, 76-3-301. 
effective on January 30, 1992, pursuant to 
307 
